Introduction
Distribution Companies (DISCOMs) form the backbone of the
power sector, bearing the brunt of both operational and financial challenges.
Their financial health is significantly strained due to high-cost legacy Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs), delayed government subsidy payments, rising coal
prices, escalating railway freight and transmission charges. These factors
collectively drive up the Average Power Purchase Cost (APPC). Additionally,
weak governance and persistently high Aggregate Technical and Commercial
(AT&C) losses exacerbate the crisis.
Addressing these issues demands structural reforms in power
distribution. While legislative un-bundling to break natural monopolies and
introduce competition may offer a long-term solution, political resistance
remains a key barrier. Alternatively, a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model
emerges as a pragmatic approach, leveraging private sector efficiency and
investment while protecting the interests of all stakeholders, including
governments, private entities, and consumers.
Privatization Framework: The Standard Bidding Document
(SBD) Approach
Recently issued Ministry of Power’s Standard Bidding
Document (SBD) outlines a structured framework for privatizing DISCOMs,
ensuring operational efficiency, transparency, and financial sustainability.
Key features of the framework include:
- Transaction
Structure: Transfer of a majority equity stake and control of a DISCOM
to a private entity through competitive bidding.
- Employee
Rights: Protection of existing employment terms for DISCOM employees.
- Bidding
Parameters:
- For
DISCOMs with AT&C loss ≥15%: AT&C loss reduction is the
primary bid parameter.
- For
DISCOMs with AT&C loss <15%: Upfront premium on equity
consideration is the bid parameter.
- Key
Agreements: Share Purchase Agreement, Shareholder Agreement, and Bulk
Supply Agreement.
- Timeline:
The process from strategy finalization to DISCOM handover is expected to
take around 32 weeks.
This framework aims to balance stakeholder interests,
ensuring efficient service delivery and financial stability. However,
deviations from these principles, particularly in the selection of bid
parameters, may undermine the reform's objectives.
Hypothetical Case Analysis: Excluding AT&C Loss
Reduction as a Bid Parameter
Scenario Assumptions
Consider a hypothetical case of DISCOM-X , a distribution
company with high AT&C losses. In this case, privatization occurs through
the sale of a 51% equity stake using a premium-based bidding approach in
deviation from the Ministry of Power's SBD provision of AT&C loss reduction
as bid parameter. Key metrics for DISCOM-X are:
Metric |
Value |
Assets (Rs. Crore) |
11,745 |
Reserve Price (51% Equity) |
1,660 |
Distribution Loss (%) |
17.89 |
AT&C Loss (%) |
37.58 |
Energy Input at Discom Periphery (MU) |
14,875 |
Collection Efficiency (%) |
78.27 |
Average Cost of Supply (Rs./kWh) |
7.85 |
If the bid parameter is changed from AT&C loss reduction
to a premium on equity, the financial and operational landscape shifts
significantly. The five-year distribution loss reduction target is set at a
modest 4.85% (from 17.89% to 13.04%).
Potential for AT&C Loss Reduction through increased
collection efficiency
- Current
AT&C Loss: 37.58%
- Envisaged
Distribution Loss (Year 5): 17.89%
- Current
Collection Efficiency: 76.04%, if collection efficiency is increased
by 5%.
- New Collection Efficiency with 5% improvement=76.04%+5%=81.04%
2. New AT&C Loss:
New AT&C Loss (%)
= (1−(Collection Efficiency (%))×(1−Distribution Loss (%))
= 1-(.8104)
*(1-.1789) = 1-.0.6652= 33.48%
So, with
a 5% increase in collection efficiency, the new AT&C Loss is 33.48%
(reduced from 37.58%).
3. Energy Input = 14875 MU (given)
New
Energy Realized (considering new AT&C
loss): Energy Realized (MU)=Energy Input (MU)×
(1−New AT&C Loss (%)100)
= 14875-*(1-.3348) =9894.71 MU
So, with a 5% increase in collection efficiency, the new energy realized is 9894.71 MU (compared to the previous 9283.56 MU).
4.
ACoS (New)=Total Cost of Supply (₹)/ New Energy Realised
= 9283.65 *7.85/9894.71= Rs.7.37
Following the same method for every 5% improvement in
collection efficiency, we get following:-
Impact of only Collection Efficiency Improvement
Collection
Efficiency (%) |
Energy
Realized (MU) |
AT&C
Loss (%) |
ACoS
(Rs./kWh) |
Reduction
in ACoS (Rs./kWh) |
76.04 (Current) |
9283.56 |
37.58% |
7.85 |
- |
81.04
(+5%) |
9894.71 |
33.48% |
7.37 |
0.48 |
86.04
(+10%) |
10356.42 |
29.48% |
7.04 |
0.81 |
91.04
(+15%) |
10889.75 |
25.48% |
6.69 |
1.16 |
96.04
(+20%) |
11494.30 |
21.48% |
6.34 |
1.51 |
For every 5% increase in collection efficiency, AT&C loss reduces, leading to a reduction in the Average Cost of Supply (ACoS) by 6.18%. Energy realization increases by around 6.5% with each 5% improvement in collection efficiency. These gains are perpetual over the 25-year license period and far exceed the one-time reserve price paid by the private operator. The remaining AT&C loss of 21.48% reflects the distribution losses including billing in-efficiency.
Following is the value of corresponding annual saving :
By prioritizing equity premium as a bid parameter, private players focus on minimal distribution loss reduction (4.85%), ignoring the potential for significant collection efficiency improvements (24.54%). This oversight harms consumers, as they forgo annual and perpetual benefits that could be realized from better AT&C loss reductions.
Regulatory Context
The regulatory framework strongly emphasizes AT&C loss
reduction in tariff determination, as highlighted in the Electricity (Second
Amendment) Rules, 2023:
- Rule
20: State Commissions must determine AT&C loss trajectories for
tariff approval, aligned with national programs like the Revamped
Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS).
- Measurement
Guidelines: The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) notification
(CEA-GO-13-25/1/2023-DPR Division/73, dated 30-06-2023) outlines clear
guidelines for calculating AT&C losses.
- Distribution Loss has been defined in Electricity ( Accounts and Additional Disclosure ) Rules 2024 notified on 10th Oct.2024 as ratio of
- Energy Sold with in Periphery of Discom/ Energy available at Discom's periphery.
Conclusion
Excluding AT&C reduction as a bid parameter for discoms having AT&C losses in excess of 15% in deviation from SBD could distort and undermine the reforms objectives, as the inefficiencies might be passed to consumers through higher tariffs. It allows private players to prioritize equity premiums over efficiency improvements, undermining consumer welfare. A robust PPP model must ensure that efficiency gains from AT&C loss reductions are shared with consumers by way of reduced tariff, government by way of reduced loss & subsidy burden, and private players by way of fair return. This balanced approach not only reduces subsidies but also avoids socializing losses while privatizing profits. Prioritizing AT&C loss reduction will lead to a win-win situation for all stakeholders and ensure a successful reform for a sustainable power distribution ecosystem.
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