10 Jan 2025

The Green Hydrogen Hype: A Reality Check for India

 Green hydrogen is often hailed as the "fuel of the future," promising a cleaner, greener energy source to combat climate change. However, a closer look reveals significant challenges, especially for a developing country like India, where energy security, affordability and efficiency are paramount. While green hydrogen may have a role in the future, its current limitations position it lower on the priority list for energy investments. 

As can be well described by the Gartner's Hype Cycle, green hydrogen is positioned between the Peak of Inflated Expectations and the Trough of Disillusionment, indicating that while there is significant enthusiasm around its potential, practical challenges such as cost, inefficiency, and logistical issues are tempering expectations. It suggests that green hydrogen is still in the experimental and speculative phase, requiring further technological and economic advancements to move toward widespread adoption.


                                                                                    TIME

 

 

 

 

 

 

Here’s why India needs to tread cautiously:

1. High Production Costs

Indian refineries and fertilizer plants currently rely on grey hydrogen, produced from natural gas via steam methane reforming, at a cost of approximately $1-2 per kilogram depending on natural gas prices. Transitioning to renewable energy sources for green hydrogen production is projected to raise costs to $3.6-$4.0 per kilogram, making green hydrogen prohibitively expensive for widespread adoption. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act provides subsidies of up to $3 per kilogram to make green hydrogen competitive, highlighting that production costs are expected to remain above this threshold in the near term. Even at $3 per kilogram, the shift to green hydrogen would result in a 50-200% increase in hydrogen costs, significantly impacting operational expenses for industries such as refineries, fertilizers, and steel, thereby reducing their competitiveness. Higher operational costs in these sectors would translate into increased prices for products like fuels, fertilizers, and steel, placing an additional subsidy burden on the government to mitigate inflationary pressures. For India, where affordable energy is vital for economic growth and poverty alleviation, such elevated costs pose a substantial challenge to the adoption of green hydrogen.

2. Renewable Energy Costs Are No Longer Falling Rapidly

One of the key assumptions driving the green hydrogen narrative is the continued decline in renewable energy costs which constitutes around 70% of the Green H2 production cost. However, the cost of renewables in India has plateaued in recent years due to factors like supply chain disruptions, increasing raw material costs, and land-use constraints. This stagnation makes it increasingly challenging to produce green hydrogen at a competitive price, particularly when renewable electricity itself is in high demand.

3. Inefficient Conversion Process

Producing green hydrogen involves splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen using electricity in a process called electrolysis. However, even the most advanced electrolyzers are only about 75% efficient, meaning that 25% of the renewable energy used is effectively wasted. In a country like India, where per capita electricity consumption remains among the lowest globally, diverting precious renewable energy to an inefficient process while spending resources on loss reduction schemes like RDSS etc raises serious questions about priorities. That wasted 25% could otherwise power homes, schools, and businesses.

4. Challenges in onsite production, storage and transport

Industrial use of green hydrogen necessitates an on-site renewable energy (RE) generation facility to avoid additional costs associated with transmission charges and energy losses from off-site solar or wind generation. Producing green hydrogen directly at the factory site not only eliminates the need for costly hydrogen storage and transportation but also requires a battery energy storage system to enable round-the-clock electrolysis. This ensures better utilization of the electrolyzer capacity, enhancing overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Item

Without Battery Storage (Batch Production)

With Battery Storage (24x7 Production)

Electrolyzer Utilization

Low (only operates during solar hours)

High (operates continuously, maximizing capacity utilization)

Energy Source

Direct solar energy

Solar energy stored in batteries

Capital Cost (Electrolyzer)

Lower (smaller electrolyzer capacity due to limited operational hours)

Higher (larger electrolyzer capacity for continuous production)

Electrolyzer Cost

Lower, as smaller electrolyzer systems are sufficient for limited hours

Higher, due to larger systems needed for continuous operation

Battery Cost

None

High (cost of batteries and related infrastructure)

Energy Efficiency

High (no storage losses)

Lower (battery efficiency losses of 10%)

Operational Cost

Lower (no battery maintenance or replacement costs)

Higher (battery maintenance, replacement, and efficiency losses)

Hydrogen Cost per kg

Moderate

Higher (increased due to battery costs and energy losses)

Reliability of Supply

Intermittent (only during solar hours)

Continuous (24x7 hydrogen availability)

Suitability

Ideal for flexible or intermittent hydrogen demand

Necessary for industries with continuous hydrogen requirements

The logistics of storing and transporting green hydrogen are major hurdles:

  • Storage: Hydrogen has a low density even in its liquid state (~70 kg/m³), requiring energy-intensive cooling and high-pressure tanks for containment, which further drive up costs.
  • Transport: Shipping green hydrogen requires 3–4 times the volume of LNG, significantly inflating transportation costs and making long-distance exports impractical.

These inefficiencies make the idea of exporting green hydrogen a costly and unrealistic ambition.

5. Lower Volumetric Energy Density

Green hydrogen's low-density results in a lower volumetric energy density and makes it highly flammable compared to alternatives like LNG. These characteristics increase costs associated with shipping, insurance, and safety measures, making it less suitable for energy-intensive applications where space and weight are critical, such as long-haul shipping.

6. Misaligned Priorities for India

India faces unique energy challenges:

  • Low Per Capita Electricity Consumption: India’s per capita electricity consumption is around 1/3rd of global average. Diverting renewable energy toward green hydrogen production instead of addressing immediate electricity needs for millions of people is a questionable strategy.
  • Need for Cost-Effective Solutions: With limited resources, India must prioritize energy investments that deliver the greatest benefit to the largest number of people. Green hydrogen, at its current stage, does not meet this criterion.

A Better Path Forward

Instead of placing disproportionate emphasis on green hydrogen, India should focus on more efficient and cost-effective solutions:

  1. Nuclear Energy: A reliable, low-carbon baseload power source that complements renewable energy.
  2. Renewable Power Expansion: Solar and wind energy can provide immediate, scalable benefits for decarbonizing the electricity grid.
  3. Energy Efficiency: Modernizing the grid, improving energy storage technologies, and enhancing energy efficiency can yield higher returns and ensure a more equitable energy transition.
  4. Hydrogen Research: India should invest modestly in research and pilot projects to improve electrolyzer efficiency and storage technologies while waiting for the production costs to decline. PLI scheme for electrolysers manufacturing under National Green Hydrogen Mission is a right step in that direction.

Conclusion

Green hydrogen undoubtedly holds long-term promise, particularly for decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors like steel and cement. However, its current economic and logistical barriers, combined with the inefficiency of the production process, make it a poor choice for large-scale deployment in India in near future. Instead of pursuing green hydrogen aggressively, India should prioritize scalable, proven, and cost-effective solutions like nuclear and renewable energy to address its pressing energy and developmental needs. By adopting a realistic approach to green hydrogen, India can ensure that its energy investments align with national priorities and provide maximum benefits to its people. Green hydrogen can take its place when the time is right—once costs reduce to around $1 per kilogram, driven by advancements in electrolyzer and storage efficiencies, enabling it to fulfill its potential.

 





3 Jan 2025

BSR: A Giant Leap in Clean Energy Transition with Small Reactor Challenges

India is poised to take a monumental leap in its journey toward sustainable energy with the introduction of Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs)—a groundbreaking initiative to harness nuclear power for grid decarbonization. Spearheaded by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), the recently issued Request for Proposal (RFP) marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s energy strategy. Designed as compact and efficient Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), these twin 220 MWe reactors aim to serve as a reliable, zero-carbon energy source for industries and the grid. This initiative signals India's commitment to innovative energy solutions that not only strengthen energy security but also align with global climate action imperatives because nuclear energy stands out as a highly efficient and environmentally sustainable power source, requiring minimal land per megawatt of capacity compared to other energy technologies. Its compact footprint makes it especially valuable in land-scarce country like India. Moreover, nuclear power boasts the lowest lifecycle carbon dioxide emissions among all major energy sources, including renewables, as it generates electricity without combustion. This unique combination of efficiency and environmental performance positions nuclear energy as a vital tool in combating climate change and supporting global decarbonisation efforts. While this approach may not align with the current international trend of modular, factory-built solutions, opening the nuclear sector to private partnerships represents a significant policy shift.

2. In this blog, we will delve deeper into the nuances of the RFP issued by NPCIL for the ambitious Bharat Small Reactors project with an aim to provide a concise summary of the proposal, discuss critical issues that need attention, and identify the leading power sector companies likely to qualify based on net worth criteria. It will also explore the expected project costs and calculate the estimated Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE), offering insights into the economic viability of this initiative. A detailed look into how uranium fuel will be sourced—both domestically and through imports—and managed throughout the project lifecycle will also be covered. Finally, the blog will examine the broader challenges, such as regulatory compliance, high eligibility thresholds, and the complexities of transitioning to nuclear power as a cornerstone of India’s decarbonization strategy.

3. Salient features of the RFP

The Request for Proposal (RFP) for the setup of 220 MWe Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs) outlines a comprehensive framework for industries to participate in India's nuclear energy expansion. Key features include:

             ·    Type and Capacity:

o  Deployment of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), with a combined capacity of 2 x 220 MWe, primarily for captive power consumption.

o   Operations will be managed by NPCIL.

·                   ·    Site Requirements:

    • Land requirement: 331 hectares for a 1 km exclusion zone or 87 hectares for a 0.5 km radius.
    • Safety compliance: Sites must avoid seismic zones and be distanced from potential hazards.
  • Regulatory Framework: Adherence to Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) standards across all phases—siting, construction, operation, and decommissioning—is mandatory.
  • Technical Specifications:
    • Cooling systems: Options for natural or induced draft towers.
    • Water requirements: Inland sites need 4800 m³/hr, while coastal sites use seawater.
  • Implementation Timeline:
    • Site approvals within 6–12 months.
    • Construction period: Approximately 42-48 months post-approval.
    • Operational life: 40 years, extendable.
    • Decommissioning as per Atomic Energy Act guidelines.
  • Commercial and Financial Aspects:
    • Eligibility: Users must consume 2500 MUs annually and have a net worth of ₹3000 crores.
    • Financial obligations: Users bear the CAPEX, OPEX, and decommissioning costs, with NPCIL expertise fees starting at ₹0.60/kWh, increasing by ₹0.01 annually.
    • Earnest Money Deposit (EMD): ₹10 crores.
  • Proposal Submission:
    • Pre-proposal meeting on January 21, 2025.
    • Submission deadline: March 31, 2025, 11:00 AM IST.
    • Proposal opening: April 4, 2025, 2:00 PM IST.
    • Submission process: Single-stage, sealed envelope with mandatory documentation (e.g., Integrity Pact, NDA).
  • Additional Provisions:
    • Exit Clause: Users cannot exit post-construction commencement, except under exceptional circumstances.
    • Force Majeure: Includes natural or political events; NPCIL bears no liability under these conditions.
    • Regulatory Oversight: AERB licenses required for all project stages, with periodic compliance checks

4.  Key Challenges: The Request for Proposal (RFP) offers a promising framework for industries to play a vital role in advancing India’s clean energy goals. However, it comes with substantial financial and regulatory commitments that pose significant challenges. A key concern is the project’s financial viability, as the entire burden of Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), Operational Expenditure (OPEX), and decommissioning costs falls solely on the user. This heavy financial responsibility risks deterring participation, particularly from industries that may find the investment and long-term obligations unsustainable.    

      a)   Financial Viability:

o   Entire financial burden (CAPEX, OPEX, taxes, and decommissioning) lies on the user.

o   High upfront costs and long payback periods may deter participation.

o Recommendation: Introduce cost-sharing mechanisms, financial incentives, or guarantees.

b)       Land Requirements:

o   Substantial land requirement (331 hectares for 1 km exclusion zone) limits participation.

o   Challenges in securing large contiguous plots.

c)       Water Requirements:

o   Inland sites require 4800 m³/hr of water, posing challenges in water-scarce regions.

o Recommendation: Introduce water conservation measures or alternative cooling technologies.

d)       Regulatory and Approval Delays:

o   Lengthy and complex approval processes involving AERB, DAE, and MoEFCC.

o   Potential delays in siting, construction, and operation.

o   Recommendation: Provide clear timelines and a single-window clearance system.

e)       Exit Clause:

o   Users exiting post-construction lose all investments, discouraging participation.

o   Recommendation: Allow more flexible exit options or partial compensation mechanisms.

f)        Tariff Regulation for Third-Party Sales:

o   Tariffs set by DAE could reduce commercial viability.

o   Recommendation: Clarify tariff mechanisms and allow competitive or market-based pricing.

g)       Expertise Fees:

o   Annual increase in NPCIL’s expertise fee (₹0.60/kWh, increasing by ₹0.01 annually) adds a growing cost burden.

o   Recommendation: Cap the expertise fee to ensure cost predictability.

h)       Force Majeure Provisions:

o   NPCIL’s liability excluded under force majeure, but user risks remain unaddressed.

o   Recommendation: Add provisions to share costs or pause obligations during such events.

i)         Spent Fuel and Decommissioning Costs:

o   Users bear responsibility for complex and costly spent fuel storage and decommissioning.

o   Recommendation: Provide detailed cost estimates and consider shared responsibilities with NPCIL.

j)         Ambiguities in Fuel and Heavy Water Management:

o   Unclear terms in the tripartite agreement for leasing and supply of fuel and heavy water.

o   Recommendation: Specify leasing terms, costs, and supply timelines.

k)       User Eligibility Criteria:

o   High thresholds (₹3000 Crore net worth and 2500 MUs annual consumption) limit participation to large players.

l)         Lack of Incentives for Early Completion:

o   No bonuses or incentives for timely or early project milestones.

o   Recommendation: Include reward mechanisms to encourage faster execution.

m)     Developer to be Captive User:

o   Long-Term Commitment: Developers must commit to consuming a majority (51% or more as per electricity rules) of the electricity generated for 40 years, which is an exceptionally long-time frame for industrial operations.

o   Changing Energy Needs: Industries may face fluctuations in electricity demand due to market conditions, technological advancements, or operational downsizing, making it difficult to consistently consume 51% of the output.

o   Risk of Overcommitment: Developers may overestimate their energy needs at the start of the project, leading to underutilization of the power plant capacity in later years.

o   Lack of Flexibility: The strict definition of captive consumption limits options for selling surplus power to third parties, even when industry requirements fall below the 51% threshold.

o   Regulatory Compliance: Ensuring compliance with captive user norms for 40 years could be administratively and legally challenging, especially with evolving regulations.

5. These issues highlight the need for revision in RFP to ensure greater feasibility and inclusivity for developers.Addressing these issues through cost-sharing mechanisms, streamlined regulatory approvals, and flexible agreements could significantly enhance the viability and attractiveness of this transformative project.

6.  User or Beneficiary?

In the context of the RFP, the "User" refers to the industrial or commercial entity responsible for setting up and consuming more than 51% of the net electricity generated by the Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs) and do third party sale for the rest. The User also serves as the Funding Provider, bearing the entire lifecycle costs of the project, including Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), Operational Expenditure (OPEX), and decommissioning. Additionally, the User acts as the Land Provider, ensuring the availability of suitable and compliant land for the nuclear power plant.

7. Why the Term "User"?

The term "User" emphasizes that the entity is not just a passive investor, but an active participant and end-user of the electricity generated. The structure allows the User to align the project with their industrial or commercial energy needs while maintaining operational collaboration with NPCIL with followings:

a)       Feeding into the Grid

·       Primary Purpose: The generated electricity is primarily for the User’s captive consumption.

·      Third-Party Sales: If the User wishes to sell surplus electricity to other customers, it may be fed into the grid for distribution to third parties.

b)     Regulation of Grid-Connected Electricity

Electricity fed into the grid will be regulated by the following authorities:

c)      Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)

·        Role: DAE determines the tariff for electricity sold to third parties as per the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.

·    Rationale: Since the project involves nuclear power, which is a strategic and regulated domain in India, DAE has overarching authority over its commercial aspects.

d)      State and Central Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs and CERC)

·      Role: Regulatory commissions oversee compliance with:

o   Grid code requirements.

o   Scheduling and dispatch regulations.

o   Tariff structures for third-party sales.

·        Applicable Laws: Electricity Act, 2003 and relevant state regulations.

e)       Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)

·      Role: Ensures safety and compliance of nuclear facilities, including aspects that could impact grid stability or radiological safety during grid operations.

 

8. Eligible Power Companies meeting net-worth criteria

Among the listed companies, besides NPCIL (Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited), NTPC Limited & L&T   have some experience with nuclear power projects. However, NPCIL is the project proponent in this case.

Other Power Companies Without Nuclear Power Experience

The following power companies while meeting the net-worth criteria do not currently operate in nuclear power:

  • Tata Power
  • Adani Power
  • Power Grid Corporation
  • NHPC
  • JSW Energy
  • NLC India
  • SJVN
  • Reliance Power
  • Torrent Power

These companies primarily focus on thermal, hydro, solar, wind, and other renewable energy sources but lack experience in nuclear power generation.

9.   LCOE Calculation for Bharat Small Reactor

      Key Assumptions:

  • Capital Cost: ₹15 crore per MW for a 440 MW plant.
  • Plant Load Factor (PLF): 68.5%.
  • Operational Life: 40 years.
  • Discount Rate: 10%.
  • Operation & Maintenance (O&M) Cost: ₹50 lakhs per MW per year.
  • Fuel Cost: ₹2 per kWh. (basis worked out in para-13)
  • Auxiliary Consumption: 11.75% (with cooling tower)

10. LCOE Calculation Details:

a)  Total Capital Cost:

₹15crore/MW×440MW=6600crore


b)  Annual Electricity Generation:

440MW×8760hours/year×0.685=2,642,928MWh/year or 2642.93 MU/year

c) Net Generation after Auxiliary Consumption= 2642.93*(1-.1175) =

2332.38 MU/year

c)  Capital Recovery Factor (CRF):

CRF=(r*(1+r) ^n) /((1+r) ^n−1),where r=0.10, n=40.

CRF≈0.10275

d)  Annualized Capital Cost:

₹6600crore×0.10275=678.15crore/year

f)       Operation & Maintenance (O&M) Cost:

₹0.5crore/MW/year×440MW=220crore/year

g)      Fuel Cost (break-up in para-13):

₹2per kWh×2642.93MU/year=528.59crore/year

h)     Total Annual Cost:

₹678.15crore+220crore+528.59crore=1426.74crore/year

i)        Estimated Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE):

LCOE=Total Annual Cost / Annual Electricity Generation. LCOE=₹1426.74crore/year /2332.38 MU/year  ≈ ₹6.11per kWh


Since final LCOE should also include NPCIL Expertise Fee: ₹0.60 per kWh, LCOE will be = ₹6.11per kWh+₹0.60 per kWh =₹ 6.76 per kWh

 

Based on given assumptions, the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for the Bharat Small Reactor project is approximately ₹6.76 per kWh inclusive of NPCIL expertise fee.

11. Fuel Supply Chain for Nuclear Reactors

a. Uranium Supply

  • Source: Natural uranium, used as fuel in PHWRs, is procured and processed domestically or through imports.
  • Domestic Sources:
    • Uranium is mined and processed by Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL), a public sector enterprise under the DAE.
    • Domestic uranium mining operations include facilities in Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, and Meghalaya.
  • Imported Uranium:
    • Additional uranium is imported to meet demand, under international agreements and safeguards.

b. Fuel Fabrication

  • Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC):
    • NFC, an entity under the DAE, fabricates the fuel assemblies required for PHWRs.
    • It processes uranium into natural uranium dioxide (UO₂) pellets, which are then loaded into zirconium alloy cladding to form fuel bundles.

c. Heavy Water Supply

  • Heavy Water Board (HWB):
    • Another entity under the DAE, the HWB produces and supplies heavy water (D₂O), which acts as both a moderator and coolant in PHWRs.

d. Fuel Leasing and Supply Agreement

For the BSR project:

  • A tripartite agreement among the User, NPCIL, and the DAE will govern the leasing and supply of fuel and heavy water.
  • Ownership: The fuel, spent fuel, and heavy water remain the property of the DAE throughout the plant’s lifecycle.

e. Key International Agreements for Imported Fuel

India sources uranium under its civil nuclear cooperation agreements with countries such as:

  • Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Australia.
  • These agreements ensure a steady supply of uranium for India’s safeguarded reactors, including those used for power generation.

f. Spent Fuel Management

  • The spent fuel remains the property of the DAE and is managed under its guidelines.
  • Long-term storage and reprocessing are overseen by DAE facilities.

g. Assurance of Supply

  • DAE ensures a secure and continuous supply of fuel to meet the operational demands of the reactors.
  • NPCIL facilitates the coordination between the User (industrial entity) and DAE for timely delivery and management of fuel. 

12. Annual Requirement of Fuel

To estimate the annual uranium requirement for a 220 MWe Bharat Small Reactor (PHWR), we consider the following factors and data:

Key Data and Assumptions

a)      Plant Load Factor (PLF):

o   PLF = 68.5% (as stated in the RFP, could increase to 72.5%).

b)      Annual Energy Generation per Reactor:

o   Rated capacity: 220 MWe.

o   Annual hours: 24x365=8760hours/year.

o   Annual energy output (at 68.5% PLF): Energy=220MW×8760hours×0.685

    =1,321,716MWh/year

c)      Twin Reactor Plant Output:

o   For two reactors: 1,321,716MWh×2=2,643,432MWh/year

o   = 2643 MU

d)      Fuel Consumption Rate:

o   PHWRs typically require about 27 kg of natural uranium per GWh (as per norms in the RFP, likely to reduce to 25 kg/GWh with efficiency improvements).

e)      Conversion to Uranium Requirement:

o   Total generation: 2,643.432GWh/

o   Using 27 kg/GWh: Uranium Required=2,643.432GWh/year×27kg/GWh=71,373kg/year 

71.37 tonnes/year

o   Using 25 kg/GWh: Uranium Required=2,643.432GWh/year×25kg/GWh=66,086kg/year

o    66.09 tonnes/year.

j)        Estimated Uranium Requirement:

a.      71.37 tonnes/year at 27 kg/GWh.

b.      66.09 tonnes/year at 25 kg/GWh (if efficiency improves).

This is for the twin-reactor (440 MWe) plant operating at 68.5% PLF. Adjustments may be needed for different PLF values or operational conditions.

13. Fuel Price / KWh estimations

a. Components of ₹2 per kWh

The ₹2 per kWh accounts for Raw Fuel Cost of natural uranium, whether domestically mined or imported, Fuel Processing and Fabrication at Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) for Converting uranium ore into fuel-grade material and fabricating it into usable fuel assemblies, Heavy Water Costs required for PHWR, Fuel Transportation, Waste Management and Overheads and Safety Compliance:

b. Industry Benchmarks

The ₹2 per kWh value is derived from industry standards and benchmarks for nuclear reactors, ensuring that all associated costs beyond raw uranium are included. While the raw uranium cost alone may be lower, processing and ancillary expenses significantly add to the overall cost.

c. Raw Uranium Cost (~₹0.30 per kWh)

  • Uranium Cost:
    • For 70 MT of uranium at ₹10,000 per kg, the cost per kWh was calculated as approximately ₹0.26–₹0.30.
  • Percentage of Total: 15%.

d. Fuel Processing and Fabrication (~₹0.60 per kWh)

  • Processing Costs:
    • Conversion of natural uranium ore into fuel-grade uranium dioxide (UO₂).
    • Fabrication of fuel assemblies at the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC).
  • Percentage of Total: 30%.

e. Heavy Water Costs (~₹0.50 per kWh)

  • Role of Heavy Water:
    • Acts as both moderator and coolant in PHWRs.
    • The reactor requires regular replenishment of heavy water due to losses during operation.
  • Costs:
    • Heavy Water Board (HWB) charges are significant, given the high cost of producing heavy water.
  • Percentage of Total: 25%.

f. Spent Fuel Management (~₹0.25 per kWh)

  • Storage and Handling:
    • Safe storage of spent fuel in on-site cooling ponds for 10 years.
    • Transition to Away-From-Reactor (AFR) storage facilities for 25+ years.
  • Reprocessing Costs:
    • If reprocessed, costs for recovering usable material and managing radioactive waste increase.
  • Percentage of Total: 12.5%.

g. Fuel Transportation (~₹0.15 per kWh)

  • Transport Logistics:
    • Secure transport of processed fuel from fabrication plants to reactor sites.
    • Compliance with safety and regulatory requirements for radioactive materials.
  • Percentage of Total: 7.5%.

h. Overheads and Safety Compliance (~₹0.20 per kWh)

  • Safety and Oversight:
    • Costs for regulatory compliance with the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).
    • Inventory reserves for continuous operation.
  • Percentage of Total: 10%.

Summary of ₹2 per kWh Fuel Cost Breakdown

Component

Cost (₹/kWh)

Percentage

Raw Uranium

₹0.30

15%

Fuel Processing & Fabrication

₹0.60

30%

Heavy Water

₹0.50

25%

Spent Fuel Management

₹0.25

12.5%

Fuel Transportation

₹0.15

7.5%

Overheads & Safety Compliance

₹0.20

10%

Total

₹2.00

100%

The ₹2 per kWh figure is a comprehensive estimate covering the entire lifecycle of nuclear fuel, from procurement and processing to transportation, operation, and waste management

14. Conclusion

The Bharat Small Reactors  initiative represents a transformative step in India’s clean energy strategy, leveraging nuclear technology to balance economic growth with environmental sustainability. While the project offers immense potential to decarbonize the grid and enhance energy security, it faces critical challenges in financial feasibility, regulatory compliance, and operational implementation. Addressing these hurdles through cost-sharing frameworks, streamlined regulatory processes, and incentives for participation can make the initiative more inclusive and viable.

By tackling these barriers, the BSR project can serve as a benchmark for innovative energy solutions, aligning India with global climate action goals and bolstering its leadership in clean energy transitions. A collaborative approach among stakeholders, including industries, policymakers, and regulators, will be key to unlocking the full potential of this ambitious endeavour.